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Abstract 
Although Xu Fuguan (1903–1982) belongs to the most important representatives of the 
Modern Confucian intellectual movement, he is rather unknown outside China. However, 
his concept of “anxiety” (youhuan yishi 憂患意識) is not only relevant for the recognition 
of the special characteristics, which determines the ideological and political structure of 
ancient Chinese society, but also for the intercultural elaboration of Jaspers’s “axial age” 
theory. This article introduces this concept to the European academic readership, and 
provides an analysis of its connection to the Modern Confucian hypothesis regarding the 
absence of an external God (or Deities) in classical Chinese culture.   
Keywords: Xu Fuguan, Modern Confucianism, anxiety, youhuan yishi, Chinese religions 
Izvleček 
Četudi sodi Xu Fuguan (1903–1982) k najpomembnejšim predstavnikom Modernega 
konfucijanstva, je zunaj Kitajske še precej neraziskan. Vendar je njegov koncept 
“zaskrbljenosti” (youhuan yishi 憂患意識) izjemno pomemben ne samo za teoretsko 
razjasnitev posebnih značilnosti, ki določajo ideološko (in s tem tudi politično) strukturo 
antične kitajske družbe, temveč tudi za medkulturno nadgradnjo Jaspersove teorije 
»osnega obdobja«. Pričujoči članek namerava predstaviti ta koncept širšim akademskim 
krogom v Evropi; avtorica v njem hkrati izdela analizo njegove povezave z Moderno 
konfucijansko hipotezo o odsotnosti zunanjega Boga (ali božanstev) v klasični kitajski 
kulturi. 
Ključne besede: Xu Fuguan, moderno konfucijanstvo, zaskrbljenost, youhuan yishi, 
kitajske religije 
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1. Introduction: Xu Fuguan’s Life and Work  
Although Xu Fuguan (1903–1982) is a significant Chinese philosopher of the 20th 
century whose theoretical contribution is in the centre of academic interests in 
China and Taiwan, he is still completely unexplored in the Western academic 
world. He was born in the beginning of the previous century in the Hubei Province 
in mainland China. His father was a traditional scholar, so Xu was at first educated 
in the traditional way which means that he had a rather good background in 
classical Chinese philosophy. Later, he attended the high school in Wuhan, which 
was the capital of this province. There, he was confronted with Western thought 
for the first time. Wuhan was also an important area for the Republican Revolution 
which ended China’s 2000-year old imperial rule in 1911.  
After this vivid period, Xu went to Japan and studied at the Meiji University, 
where he became influenced by several Western theoretical currents including 
Marxism. He then joined the Nationalist army and attained the rank of senior 
colonel. After leaving the army, Xu worked in various teaching positions, 
published an academic journal, and then involved himself in politics, working as 
political advisor until 1946. In the beginning of the forties he met his most 
important teacher Xiong Shili, the famous pioneer of the Modern Confucian 
movement; Xu was profoundly fascinated and influenced by his philosophy. Due 
to Xiong’s influence, he began to devote himself again to the study and research of 
the traditional Chinese thought (Ni 2002, 283). 
Shortly before the end of the civil war, he moved to the island of Taiwan to 
where the Nationalists (Guomin dang 國民黨) retreated in 1949. Between 1955 
and 1969, he taught at the Donghai University (東海大學), and later at the famous 
New Asian Academy (新亞學院) in Hong Kong (Ni 2002, 285) where he stayed 
till his death in 1982. 
Xu Fuguan’s fields of research were mostly philosophy, sociology of culture, 
and literary and art criticism. He is noted as one of the first theoreticians of the 
specific Chinese aesthetics in Contemporary Chinese thought. 
Although Xu was primarily an excellent essay writer, he also excelled with a 
wide knowledge about the development of ancient Chinese society especially 
concerning its political, spiritual, and cultural characteristics. Due to such special 
interests, he did not publish any excessively profound philosophical discussions, 
which was otherwise the case with the majority of other Modern Confucians. His 
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fundamental methodological approach which determined his specific vision of the 
conceptual development of traditional Chinese spiritual culture still remains 
widely unknown until the present day, although the results of his studies in this 
field are extremely interesting, and could represent an important contribution to 
the further research in comparative cultural studies. 
As we shall see later, almost all Modern Confucians emphasized the 
importance of building a new ontology that could serve as a basis for 
Confucianism’s renewal. Xu Fuguan was practically the only representative of the 
second generation of Modern Confucians who considered that metaphysics and 
ontology were not appropriate instruments for understanding ancient Chinese 
thought, and much less for the development of its interpretation, because, 
according to him, its pragmatic nucleus has never led to any composition or any 
structured and coherent conception of a metaphysical system, as has been 
established, for instance, by the ancient Greek philosophers (Xu 2005, 43ff). 
Instead, ancient Chinese philosophers have developed an idea of ethics, based on 
the “divine or heavenly” essence of human beings, directly from the “primitive” 
state of religious and mythological society.  
 
2. Xu Fuguan’s Intellectual Context: the Modern Confucian 
Movement and its Relevance for Modern Chinese Social and 
Philosophical Studies  
Xu Fuguan is one of the central representatives of Contemporary Modern 
Confucianism (新儒學 Xin Ruxue) which belongs to the most interesting and 
relevant theoretical currents in modern China and Taiwan. The Confucian revival 
belongs to the most important reversals in modern Chinese history. For almost a 
century, Confucianism has been condemned to the “dustbin” of history as 
dysfunctional ideology to the Chinese progress toward modernity. In his classical 
work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the 19
th
-century German 
sociologist Max Weber argued that Confucianism was incompatible with the 
development of a modern economic system (Rošker 2013, 89ff). He saw in the 
brand of Protestantism practiced in northern Europe the only ethical system with 
the attributes needed to make capitalism work. History has proved Weber wrong. 
Now, it is quite clear that the most capitalistic societies at the dawn of the 21
st
 
century are to be found in Asia. It is no coincidence that all of them are located 
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within the so-called Confucian cultural zone. The success of Japan and the “Four 
Tigers” (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), and recent rapid 
development of P.R. China owe much to such crucial Confucian virtues as social 
hierarchy, selfdiscipline, social harmony, strong families, and respect for 
education. This has led to unprecedented and increasingly broader international 
interest in this ideology.  
The current of Modern Confucianism mainly developed during the 20
th
 
Century in Taiwan and Hong Kong, but soon also gained popularity in Korea and 
Japan (Lee 2001, 69). In the early eighties, Modern Confucianism also began to 
reappear in the P.R. China as one of the most important ideological concerns. This 
phenomenon is very much worth examining for it can tell us about our times and 
the fate of one of the most important philosophical legacies in the world.  
Modern Confucianism, to which we count this theoretician, is a discourse 
within which the development guidelines of the rehabilitation of Chinese 
traditionalism were most clearly expressed. This fraction developed in the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, and was not completely established before 1957. In 
this year, a group of Taiwanese and Hong Kong philosophers published the 
famous Declaration for the Re-evaluation of the Chinese Culture as a World 
Heritage (為中國 文化敬告世界人士宣言 Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shiji 
erenshi xuanyan) on the first day of the year 1958. This document represents the 
fundamental manifesto, and specifies goals and contents of Modern Confucianism. 
The members of the group who published this declaration were, besides Xu 
Fuguan also Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang, 1887–1969), Mou Zongsan (1909–
1995), and Tang Junyi (1909–1978). 
These Modern theoreticians still count as the founders of Modern 
Confucianism, a system which aims to provide a systematic reinterpretation of 
traditional Chinese philosophy (and thus, of the Chinese culture in general through 
the lens of a deeper and broader understanding of Western, in particular Plato’s, 
Kant’s, and Hegel’s philosophy) (Bresciani 2001, 27). 
These philosophers are generally referred to as the main representatives of the 
second generation of Modern Confucianism (Bresciani 2001, 27). In contrast to 
the pioneers of this movement who (at least till the year 1949, but most of them till 
their death) lived in mainland China, they have mostly lived and worked in 
Taiwan, and partly in Hong Kong. 
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In the process of modernization Modern Confucians mostly saw a kind of 
rationalization of the world. In search for its new philosophical basis, they focused 
mainly on questions connected to ontology which they usually came to know in 
the framework of Western ideas and philosophical systems. Generally they 
followed the premise according to which the questions of innermost reality of the 
universe, the substance of being and the Absolute, are the very questions that 
determine the meaning of human life (Bresciani 2001, 27). As such, these 
questions are essential for the establishment of a new, modern society, and for the 
preservation of an integrated, un-alienated cultural and personal identity of the 
individuals in China.  
The current of Modern Confucianism emerged from the attempt to synthesize 
Western and Chinese traditional thought, whereas at their time, these attempts 
were defined with the crisis of both types of discourses (Rošker 2013, 75). The 
ideals of Modern Confucians were not limited to the striving for revitalization and 
rehabilitation of ideological traditions from which they arose; it was obvious that 
they could begin the intellectual process of modernizing Confucianism only on the 
basis of its synthesis with ideas “imported” from Euro-American philosophy, 
because this philosophy represented the very cultural context from which the 
modernization actually emerged.  
However, the Modern Confucian efforts to modernize Confucianism did not 
derive only from the tendency for a solution of their own tradition, but were also 
based, on the other hand, upon their wish to rescue the Western philosophical 
tradition which had, as it seemed, become caught into their own intellectual traps. 
In general, the members of the “second generation” strove for a revitalization 
of their own cultural identity in the sense of “transplanting old roots” of their own 
tradition, because they saw this method as the only way for a possible survival of 
the cultural tradition from which they arose. This renovation of the “roots,” 
however, should not merely serve as a tool for the survival of Chinese tradition. 
The members of the second generation (including Xiong Shili) sincerely hoped 
that it could also provide new methods for an elaboration and further development 
of general philosophy and ethic on the global level. If this renovation of traditional 
Chinese thought was carried out conscientiously and accurately enough, it could 
thus in their view lead to the establishment of a new philosophical system of 
modernized Chinese thought which could actively involve itself into international 
dialogues in modern societies.  
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Among the above mentioned arguments the central thesis of the Declaration 
(also known as the Manifesto) is based upon the supposition that Chinese, 
especially Confucianism, contained “seeds of democracy.” As we shall see later, 
Xu also developed this supposition further in his historical and philosophical work, 
striving for the establishment of a liberal constitutional democracy in a 
modernized China. In this task he saw an internal precondition for the further 
development of the Chinese tradition (Chen 2009, 19). But not only Xu Fuguan, 
but other authors of the Manifesto also claimed that many central ideas and 
practices in Chinese tradition were consistent with the spirit of democracy. They 
believed, for instance, that the Will of Heaven (tian zhi 天志) reflected itself in the 
will of the people. Thus, the ruler should follow people’s wishes, especially 
considering the Confucian suppositions that “everything under the Heaven belongs 
to the public (tianxia weigong 天下為公 )” and that everyone has the moral 
potential to become a sage, thus implying human equality (Chen 2009, 19): 
Xu Fuguan developed the contradiction of double subjectivity (shuang chong 
zhutixing) in Chinese history which is one of the central notions of his 
political thought. According to true Confucian thinking, the people should be 
the subjects (zhuti) or primary actors in the political order, in practice in 
Chinese history the monarch or emperor was the subject or primary actor in 
the political order. In his view, Confucianism requires the rulers to put aside 
their self-interests and to serve only the interests of people. However, in the 
actual course of Chinese history, such Confucian ideal was seldom realized 
and Confucianism did not develop sufficient institutional safeguards to 
restrain the exercise of absolutist imperial power. (Chen 2009, 19) 
One of Xu Fuguan’s main theses about Confucianism and democracy is namely 
that the Confucian
1
 theory of the goodness of “human nature” (renxingshan 人行
善) provides the moral foundation for democracy2. This positive and optimistic 
view of human nature affirms human dignity and leads to respect, trust and faith in 
the people. Xu argued that democracy is based on such views. He also argued that 
the opposite view of human nature––that human nature is basically evil would lead 
to the opposite of democracy: If people are evil and not to be trusted, then 
authoritarian rule is to be justified to keep them from evil. Xu believes that 
Western liberal democracy is universally applicable, and points out that there is no 
                                                 
1  Or, more precisely, Neo-Confucian, for this theory is based on the Mencian interpretation of 
original Confucianism which had been elaborated and further developed during the Song Dynasty by 
the main representatives of the School of structure (理學) (Rošker 2013, 87). 
2 For Xu Fuguan’s practical strategies to attain this aim see Lee Su-San, 1998. 
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specifically Chinese style of democracy. Xu’s writings also affirm the basic 
proposition of  the 1958 Declaration: the democratization of China is not only 
consistent with its Confucian cultural heritage, but could represent a natural 
development of the Confucian tradition and enable Confucian ideals to be better 
realized than before (Chen 2009, 20ff). 
Although Xu was fully committed to Confucianism, he recognized that there 
were deficiencies and weaknesses in the Confucian tradition. For example, he 
points out that the Confucian conception of “five cardinal relationships” (wulun 五
倫) did not sufficiently address the relationship between the government and the 
people. He suggests that traditional Confucianism looks upon politics mainly from 
the standpoint of the ruling elite rather that from standpoint of the people. He also 
notices that, in emphasizing duties and obligations, Confucianism and traditional 
Chinese culture did not facilitate the development of the individual subject’s self-
consciousness, nor the assertion of his/her subjectivity, legitimate interests and 
rights. Therefore, he suggests that the modernized Confucian philosophy should 
not only preach the achievement of moral excellence by human beings, but also 
preach liberty, equality and human rights (Xu 2005, 20–23). At the same time, he 
believes that Confucian ideas of conscience and moral restraint in recognition of 
the interests of others can enable Western liberal democracy––which originated in 
the struggle for individual’s rights––to find a firmer moral foundation. Thus, in his 
view, Confucianism can not only give rise to democracy in China, but can also 
provide deeper roots for it in the West. 
 
3. The Concept of Anxiety and its Socio-cultural Origins  
As a co-signer of the fabove-mentioned amous 1958 Declaration, Xu Fuguan also 
tried to capture the central or basic spirit of Chinese cultural tradition which could 
link all of its parts together. Through it, he hoped to be able to reveal its values and 
to revitalize and re-appropriate them rather than to construct a theoretical system 
that would force upon tradition. According to him, the basic characteristic of the 
Chinese philosophic tradition is its origin in the sense of “anxiety” (youhuan yishi 
憂患意識 ) or, literary, in a “concerned consciousness,” in contrast to the 
beginning of Western philosophic tradition, which has been marked by a sense of 
wonder or curiosity to know the human being and the natural world: 
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The Greeks held rationality to be the defining feature of human being, and the 
love of wisdom or contemplation the source of happiness. They took knowing 
as a leisurely activity pursued for the sake of itself. These characteristics of 
Greek culture resulted in the pursuit of objective knowledge, especially the 
development of metaphysics and science. Modern Western thinkers inherited 
this tradition. However, while the Greeks took “knowing” as a way of 
education, modern Western thinkers shifted knowledge to be the persistent 
search for power through possessing and controlling the external material 
world, as expressed by Francis Bacon’s famous motto “knowledge is power.” 
(Ni 2002, 283) 
According to Xu, the entire Chinese traditional culture and philosophy is based on 
these characteristics of the sense for anxiety that have led the Chinese tradition 
towards the search for virtue and value rather than for science and understanding, 
and to moral practice rather than to speculation. Xu believed that the “sense of 
anxiety” results from man’s first awakening to his/her own responsibility to the 
world and will eventually solve the quandary because he/she is morally 
autonomous (Ni 2002, 284ff). 
The sense of anxiety leads to discovery, understanding and transformation of 
human beings themselves. It is a psychological state in which one feels responsible 
to overcome difficulties by virtue of one’s own efforts. It originated from a moral 
conscience, an anxiety above not having one’s moral quality cultivated and not 
having learned. It is a sense of responsibility, responsiveness, discernment and 
self-reflexivity. What it les to are ideas such as reverence, respect for, and the 
manifestation of moral character. This sense enabled humans to apprehend the 
purpose of human life from the perspective of cosmic creativity or religion. In 
contrast, the Christian idea of the sense of guilt in original sin and the Buddhist 
idea of suffering and impermanence both lead to a search for an escape from 
reality, and for a salvation in Heaven and in the tranquil realm in Nirvana 
respectively: 
憂患與恐怖,絕望是最大不同者點,在於憂患心理的形成,乃是從當事者對
吉凶成敗的深意熟考而從的遠見; 在這種遠見中, 主要發現了吉凶成敗與
當事者行為的密切關係, 及當事者在興未上所應負的青任. 憂患正是有這
種青任感來的要以已力突破因難而尚末突破時的心理狀態. 乃人類精神
開始直接對事物發生青任感的表現, 也即是精神上開始有了人地自覺的
表現.  
The biggest difference between the sense of anxiety and the sense of dread 
and despair is that the sense of anxiety originates from a person’s vision 
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obtained through deep thinking and reflection about good fortune and bad 
fortune, success and failure. The vision entails the discovery of a close 
interdependence between the fortunes and the person’s own conduct and the 
person’s responsibility to his conduct. Anxiety is the psychological state of a 
person when his feeling of responsibility urges him to overcome certain 
difficulties, and he has not got through them yet. ... In a religious 
atmosphere centered around faith, a person relies on faith for salvation. He 
hands all the responsibilities to God and will therefore have no anxiety. His 
confidence is his trust in God. Only when one takes over the responsibility 
oneself will he have a sense of anxiety. This sense of anxiety entails a strong 
will and a spirit of self-reliance. (Xu 2005, 20) 
From a formal point of view, Confucianism does not predict any kind of religious
3
 
ceremonies, and yet is familiar with the idea of the creator which manifests itself 
in tiandao 天道 (the way of heaven/nature) which is creativity itself, but with the 
difference that Confucian creativity is not personified. 
 
4. Anxiety as a Product of Vanishing Deities 
Anthropomorphic deities were known by Chinese during the Shang (or Yin, 
approx. 1600–1066 BC) and the Zhou dynasties, but Confucius and Mencius 
transformed originally anthropomorphic form of the “Heaven or Nature” (tian天) 
into the concept of “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming 天命) which was a moral or 
ideological concept. Confucians were therefore not interested in personification of 
the “Way of Heaven” (tiandao 天道) and its transformation into an external 
anthropomorphic God. They were more interested in the method of its individual 
internalization than in its symbolic forms of creativity. 
Most of the Modern Confucians have critically questioned ethical systems that 
are based on religion of external deities; according to them, such systems represent 
a primitive form of social faith and belong to the earlier stages of social 
development, in which the majority of people has not yet established the inner 
strength and autonomy which could enable them to bear the transience of life, and 
provide them a possibility to cope with the external world. As Jana S. Rošker 
(2013, 198) points out, God, as an expression of a higher incomprehensible and 
uncontrollable force which has the ability of making decisions about destruction 
                                                 
3  Here, religion is understood as a form of spiritual faith, which is rooted in the concepts of 
immortality, divine creator and the existence of the soul. 
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and salvation, is in this context actually only a kind of consolidating consciousness, 
only a projection of the actual helplessness of the individual and his/her inability 
to deal with the facts that enable, define and limit its being. 
According to this view, people who need religion are like children, who in 
their immaturity cannot completely separate themselves from the paternalistic care 
and simultaneous restrictions embodied by their parents. In the context of ethics 
which is based on the idea of God, the individuals are thus all but able to live an 
autonomous life, i.e. to possess a truly internalized (or innate) ability to bear the 
ethical responsibility for their own actions and decisions (Rošker 2013, 198). 
Similar to the prevailing currents of Western historiography which have seen 
the Ancient Greek society as a “cradle of Western culture,” the society dominated 
by the Zhou dynasty was understood as the “cradle of (Han)-Chinese culture” by 
most Chinese historians (Rošker 2013, 198).  
Xu Fuguan saw the reasons for different concepts of ethics in Chinese and 
Western societies respectively in different ideological reactions to similar 
conditions of social transitions: 
In his view, all culture had their earliest beginning in religion, originating 
from the worship of God or gods. The peculiarity of Chinese culture has been 
that it soon came down, step by step, from heaven to the world of men, to the 
concrete life and behaviour of humans. ... During the Zhou Dynasty (1459–
249 BC), the preoccupation with earthly matters had started: the spirit of self-
conscience was beginning to work and those people developed clear will and 
purpose. They were moving progressively from the realm of religion to the 
realm of ethics. Since that early stage, the Chinese people were free from 
metaphysical concerns. Unlike the Greeks, who at the same critical stage in 
history moved from religion to metaphysics, the Chinese moved from religion 
to ethics (Brecsciani 2001, 338).   
Xu Fuguan who developed the concept of anxiety, thus provided a fruitful 
foundation for further development of many aspects of Modern Confucian 
philosophy that were later on elaborated by his colleagues and followers. He also 
showed in detail how the concept of this sense of anxiety was developed by the 
duke of Zhou and how it became known in Chinese culture later on through 
Confucianism (Brecsciani 2001, 23ff). 
The “Moral Self,” as essentially interpreted by the second generation of 
Modern Confucianism in terms of ideological core of perception and possible 
identification of the individual, was established during the period of “the clash” of 
Asian Studies I (XVII), 2 (2013), pp. 71–87 
81 
various local cultures. This was provoked by the fact that all non-transparent series 
of “feudal” states of the Zhou dynasty were rooted in different traditions that 
formed various religious ideas. 
Broadly speaking, the Zhou dynasty was a successor of two different types of 
culture: it was a fusion of an agrarian system which represented the typical 
production and reproductive form of the defeated Shang dynasty (or Yin, 1600–
1066 BC) on the one side, and of the hunting and food gathering system which 
represented the socio-economic mode of production in the society of 
predominantly nomadic invaders on the other. The conceptual world of the Shang 
dynasty was based on the cult of fertility, and its economic system of cooperation 
and division of labour within the family clan, whereas the nomadic religion of the 
Zhou invaders was founded upon the cult of heaven. 
In a cultural sense, both of these production modes were the heritage of the 
Zhou society. The mixture of elements of agrarian and nomadic religions was a 
result of their collision. The cult of ancestors as a type of ritualized worship that 
combines both aspects gradually became a common thread throughout all periods 
of Chinese history (Brecsciani 2001, 23ff). 
There is a fairly widespread opinion in sinology that the cult of ancestors is in 
fact a religion, since it relates to the belief in the afterlife, and seeks protection of 
the individual (and his/her clan) by the spirits of ancestors. Since Confucius was 
agnostic (see Rošker 2005, 49), his emphasis on the cult of ancestors cannot be 
understood as a religious, but rather a moral ritual. This position was also 
highlighted and emphasized by Xu Fuguan; mainly in his research on the 
ideologies of pre-Qin period: 
至於鬼神祭祀這種風俗, 孔子在知識上不能證明其必有, 但也不能在知識
上證明其必無, 而主張將其改造為對祖先的孝敬, 一表現自己的誠敬仁愛
之德. 因此, 孔子及由孔子發展下來的祭祀, 實質上不是宗教性的活動, 是
使每一個人以自己為中心的自私之念通過祭祀而得到一種澄汰與純化. 
As regards the custom of worshipping the spirits and deities, Confucius 
wasn’t able to prove the urgent need for its existence on the cognitive level, 
but also failed to demonstrate the urgent need for its nonexistence. Therefore 
he advocated that this custom transforms itself into the custom of respectful 
worship of the ancestors, through which the individual could express his/her 
virtues of sincere respect, humanity and love. This worship, which began with 
Confucius and had developed further after him, is in fact no form of religious 
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activity. The meaning of this worship is only to purify and enrich the 
egocentric self––awareness of the individual (Fang and Li 1989, III/614).  
On the other hand, as has been clearly shown in various studies, a clear 
developmental pattern of transformations from nature to moral self be observed in 
most human religions: 
从宗教学上来看，殷人所具有的宗教信仰本质上是属于‘自然宗教’的形
态，而尚未进至‘伦理宗教’的形态。这个重要的判断与宗教发展的一般
规律是相吻合的，因为人类社会发展的历史表明，宗教的进化基本上都
有一个由自然宗教向伦理宗教发展的过程，很少能有例外。殷代的卜辞
完全没有关于道德智慧的术语. 
From the viewpoint of religious studies, it can be claimed that the religion of 
the Yin dynasty still belonged to “natural religions” and did not have any 
characteristics that are typical for “moral religions.” This important 
supposition is linked to the general laws of religious development. The 
developmental history of human societies has namely clearly shown that 
religions have always developed from natural into moral ones, and that this 
process has almost no exceptions. The still preserved inscriptions from the 
time of the Yin dynasty do not imply any moral wisdoms or moral 
terminology. (Chen 1996, 23) 
God, or “the ultimate ruler” (Shang di 上帝), who represented the highest religious 
entity in the Shang (Yin) culture, did not yet refer to interpersonal or human ethics 
(Yang 2007, 2). According to Yang Zebo, this fact clearly demonstrates that the 
religion of the Shang period was still at an early stage of development, and thus 
limited to the sphere of the nature. This has radically changed after the defeat of 
Shang (Yin) dynasty by the Zhou invaders. In Yang’s opinion, the reason for 
transformation of prevailing natural religion to the morality lies in the “concerned 
consciousness” (youhuan yishi 憂患意識)4 of the ruling class which in turbulent 
time of political and social chaos wanted to ensure the power and to justify it 
through this ideology (Rošker 2013, 201).  
It can be argued that the traditional religious concepts, which were central 
parts of the dominant beliefs during the early Zhou dynasty, almost completely 
dissolved after the consolidation of the new culture which implied both agrarian as 
well as nomadic elements. This turning point was extremely important, for it 
                                                 
4  Here, Yang Zebo, a theoretician from P.R. China, uses the central concept of Xu Fuguan’s 
philosophy or social psychology, without quoting or at least mentioning him.  
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indicated that in this time the Chinese society already entered into the period 
labelled as the “Axial period” by Karl Jaspers (1956, 98). 
Chen Lai (1996, 4) points out the reasons for this turning point in Chinese 
history. He claims that this transformation did not emerge because people 
recognized their own limitations and were therefore directed towards the search 
for some kind of transcendent and infinite existence which could have led to the 
establishment of a monotheistic religion, but on the contrary: they recognized the 
limitations of deities, and thus focused upon the real world and upon problems 
connected to the regulation of society and of human relations. Thus this important 
shift in Chinese history did not manifest any kind of a “breakthrough towards 
transcendence”; instead, it has marked a “breakthrough towards humanities” 
(Chen 1996, 4). 
All this indicates an important difference in the intellectual and spiritual 
development of Chinese and European cultures after the “axial period.” While the 
latter ones stepped on the path of “more developed” forms or stages of religion, 
the further ideal development of Chinese society was not determined by any turn 
towards monotheism, but rather to the pragmatically defined search for an ideal 
social order. 
The reason for this orientation lies in the fact that it came to the major 
religious crisis in China before the onset of axial age, in which Heaven as supreme 
god and supreme moral instance lost his credibility. 
And since this morally defined religion during the early period of western 
Zhou dynasty lost all of its moral glitter, it would be difficult to overcome the 
doubt that had already prevailed in the broadest strata of population and to re-
establish the theological mindset that would enable the development of 
monotheistic religion. Thus the supreme deity has been replaced with the belief in 
the rational structure of the universe, while the concept tian 天, which previously 
denoted “Heaven” (in a spiritual sense), was simply turned into “nature” (Yang 
2007, 3). 
Xu Fuguan (and some other representatives of the second generation, 
particularly Mou Zongsan) followed the assumption that due to such historical 
process of social transformation in China, the idea of Heaven or nature 
transformed from an anthropomorphic force majeure into something that defines 
the inner reality of every human being (Fang and Li 1989, III/608). Xu Fuguan 
Tea SERNELJ: Xu Fuguan’s Concept of Anxiety 
84 
points out (2005, 15) that the original Confucianism tried to establish an ethical 
basis for moral decisions in the idea of subjective justice, which should have 
replaced the previous fear of ghosts (or, in other words, the hope for the salvation 
in heaven instead of the suffering in hell) as a basic criterion.  
He points out that the reason for such a transformation lied in the higher level 
of spiritual development, in contrast to transformations that led to monotheistic 
religions that were based upon the idea of (external) God. In his opinion, this 
transformation led to humanism which is based on a rather high level of “self-
awareness” (自覺性): 
人類的文化, 都是從宗教開始, 中國也不例外. 但是文化形成一種明確而
合理的觀念, 因而與人類行為以提高向上的影響力量, 則需發展到有某程
度的自覺性. 宗教可以誘發人的自覺; 但原始宗教, 常常是由對天滅人禍
的恐怖情緒而來的原始性地對神秘之力的皈依, 並不能表示何種自覺的
意識. 即在高度發展的宗教中, 也因人, 因時代之不同, 而可成為人地自覺
的助力; 也可成為人地自覺的阻礙. 從遺留到現在的殷代銅器來看, 中國
文化, 到殷代已經有了很長的歷史, 完成了相當高度的發達. 但從甲骨文
中, 可以看出殷人的精神生活, 還未脫離原始狀態; 他們的宗教, 還是原始
性的宗教. 當時他們的行為, 似乎是通過卜辭而完全決定於外在的神 – 祖
宗神, 自然神, 及上帝. 周人的貢獻, 便是在傳統的宗教生活中, 注入了自
覺的精神; 把文化在器物方面的成就, 提升而為觀念方面的展開, 以啟發
中國道德地人文精神的建立. 
All human cultures begin with religion. China is no exception in this 
perspective. But cultures form a series of clear and reasonable ideas that affect 
the development of human behaviour––they have to develop a certain kind of 
level of the self––awareness of human beings. Primitive religions are mostly 
defined by the primitive belief in the miraculous supernatural powers which 
originates from the feelings of horror from extinction and accidents that are 
caused by Heaven/nature. We don’t find any kind of self-consciousness in 
these religions. Highly developed religions differ with one another according 
to society and period in which they arise. Therefore, the human self-
awareness can either accelerate or be inhibited. If we look at the bronze 
vessels which have been preserved from the Yin period, we are able to see that 
the Chinese culture at that time already had a fairly long history and has been 
on a quite high level of development. But if we look closely to the records 
written on the bones and turtle shells, we can see that the spiritual life of the 
people in that time was still on a primitive level; it can be found from oracles 
that they still believed their lives were completely dependent on the various 
deities. That case involved the spirit of ancestors, natural deities and the 
supreme ruler Shang di. The contribution of the people from the period of 
Zhou dynasty was their implication of the spirit of self––awareness in their 
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traditional religious life. With that contribution they managed to raise up the 
culture that had been based on material accomplishments into the realm and 
thus contribute in the establishment of the Chinese humanistic spirit (Xu 2005, 
15–16). 
The concept of jing 敬 (reverence), which emerged in the early Zhou dynasty, and 
which reflected such a humanistic attitude, also resulted from the sense of anxiety 
which differed from religious piety in the following way: 
宗教的虔敬, 是人把自己的主體性消解掉, 將自己投擲於神的面前而徹底
敀歸於神的心理狀態. 周初所强調的敬, 是人的精神, 由散漫而集中, 並消
解自己的官能欲望於自己所負的青任之前, 凸顯出自己主體的積極性與
理性作用.  
Religious piety is a state of the mind when one dissolves one’s own 
subjectivity and throws oneself entirely before God, and takes refuge 
thoroughly in God. The reverence of the early Zhou is a humanitarian spirit. 
The spirit collects itself from relaxation to concentration; it dissolves bodily 
desires in front of one’s own [moral] responsibility, and manifests rationality 
and autonomy of the subject. (Xu 2005, 22) 
Xu investigates the process of consolidation of this individual autonomy and 
analyzes how it was connected to the concept of anxiety; he also clearly shows 
that the appearance of various central Confucian virtues has also been part of this 
process. 
Among others, the recognition of the belief that one should try to find the 
resources for overcoming difficulties within oneself has led ancient Chinese 
thinkers to study and to cultivate “the governing part of the Self,” i.e. xin 心, or the 
“heart-mind.” According to Xu, what represented Ren wen 人文 (the humanities) 
in the Spring and Autumn period (770–476) was the concept li 禮 (rituality––rules 
of propriety). Confucius located the foundation of li in what is in human heart-
mind, namely, the central virtue of ren 仁 (human heartedness, mutuality). Ren is a 
conscious state of the mind that includes enduring quest for self-perfection and the 
awareness of unconditional duties toward others. Confucius thereby turned an 
external world of human rules (li) inward and opened up “an internal world of 
moral character” as the foundation of morality, in contrast to primary functions of 
li and ren, because on this primary level ren is an innate quality and li is the 
outward manifestation of this innate quality. This transformation was a part of the 
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general process of the establishment of the inner moral self. According to Xu, that 
was Confucius’ greatest contribution to Chinese civilization (Xu 2005, 22). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The present article was designed to determine Xu Fuguan’s view on anxiety, and 
to investigate its connection to traditional Chinese philosophic and religious 
discourses. The research has revealed that Xu’s studies in the history of social 
sciences, theology and moral philosophy can represent an important elaboration 
and a further development of Jasper’s “axial age” theory. In addition, Xu Fuguan’s 
work is also important for contemporary intercultural studies, since it points out 
certain culturally conditioned elements of religion and philosophy that have 
decisively influenced early (and later, the overall traditional) Chinese culture and 
society. 
Xu has not only provided a complex analysis of the historical and cultural 
background of the specific Chinese “sense of anxiety,” but also exposed that it was 
connected to the phenomenon of “vanishing Deities” in ancient China. These 
research results are not only relevant for an intercultural elaboration of the “axial 
age” theory, but are also important for the investigation of the Modern Confucian 
supposition, according to which the transformation of the ancient “external Deities” 
into the inner “Moral Self” represents an important, specifically Chinese 
contribution to the ethical heritage of humanity. Further research shall show 
whether this supposition can be verified, and thus whether the Modern Confucian 
concept of the “Moral Self” could represent a suitable and sustainable foundation 
for the establishment of new global ethical systems. 
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